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EVIDENCE - USE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS NOT RESULTING IN
CONVICTION ARE PERMISSIBLE FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES IF PROBATIVE OF VERACITY AND READILY PROVABLE. State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 468 A.2d 319 (1983).
The defense counsel in a rape case asked the prosecutrix on crossexamination whether she had previously brought an assault charge
against a former boyfriend. l After an objection to this question was sustained, the defense counsel proffered that the prosecutrix had previously
charged a former boyfriend with criminal assault and then recanted the
charge while testifying at his tria1. 2 The trial judge rejected the argument
that the recantation under oath was relevant to the prosecutrix's credibility, and prohibited further questioning on the matter.3 The defendant
was subsequently found guilty4 and appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which reversed the conviction. 5 The court of appeals
granted certiorari and affirmed, holding that the inquiry into a false accusation previously made by the prosecutrix while under oath was proper
for impeachment purposes. 6
English common law allowed inquiry into any particular misconduct of a witness that tended to impugn his character (a prior bad act),
even though the act had not been the basis for a criminal conviction. 7
Although this questioning presented the dangers of harassing the witness
and of undue prejudice, the disciplined discretion of the bar was relied
upon to avoid abuses. 8 In this country, however, there is a lack of agreement as to whether prior bad acts can be used for impeachment purposes. 9 Generally, evidence of particular instances of misconduct is
inadmissible for impeachment purposes on the grounds that its introduction may result in confusion of the jury and unfair surprise to the opponent. lO Prior misconduct, however, tends to be more probative of a
witness's lack of veracity than does opinion or reputation testimony.ll
1. State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 176, 468 A.2d 319, 320 (1983).
2. [d. at 177, 468 A.2d at 320. Defense counsel proffered that the prosecutrix "first
came into court and said that [the defendant] did commit the assault, and then on
cross-examination the information I have is that she then recanted it." [d.
3. [d. at 177,468 A.2d at 321.
4. [d. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.
5. Cox v. State, 51 Md. App. 271,443 A.2d 607 (1982), afJ'd, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d
319 (1983).
6. Cox v. State, 298 Md. 173, 468 A.2d 319 (1983). The trial judge had therefore
abused his discretion by not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine the witness.
[d. at 184, 468 A.2d at 324.
7. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 42 (E.
Cleary 3rd ed. 1984). There are five means of attacking the credibility of a witness:
(1) prior inconsistent statements; (2) bias; (3) attacks upon character; (4) defects in
capacity to observe or remember; and (5) disproving the facts testified to by the
witness. [d. § 33.
8. [d. § 42.
9. See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
10. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 979, at 826-27
(Chadbom rev. 1970).
11. See id. One commentator stated: "It is easier to believe that a person is dishonest
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Thus, in recognition of the importance of assessing a witness's credibility,
two exceptions to the general rule forbidding the introduction of specific
instances of misconduct have been created by judicial decision. Subject
to the trial court's discretion, prior acts resulting in conviction are generally admissible so long as they are relevant to determining a witness's
credibility.12 The rationale for this rule is that the misconduct has been
conclusively established, thereby obviating the danger that the witness's
veracity will be unfairly impugned. 13 The second recognized exception,
concerning prior bad acts not resulting in conviction, cannot be so unequivocally stated.
Discord among the jurisdictions concerning the admissibility of
prior bad acts not resulting in conviction has resulted in three different
approaches. The majority of courts,14 as well as the Federal Rules of
and untruthful when it can be shown that he has been dishonest and untruthful
before, than it is to believe that a person is dishonest and untruthful because his
neighbors and associates believe him to be so." Note, Impeaching and Rehabilitating a Witness With Character Evidence: Reputation, Opinion, Specific Acts and Prior
Convictions, 9 V.C.D. L. REV. 319, 329 (1976). Impeachment by opinion or reputation testimony is more common than impeachment by prior misconduct. Section 9115 of the Maryland Code of Courts and Judicial Proceedings abrogated the common law rule that only allowed a character witness to testify as to the defendant's
reputation for truthfulness in the community. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 9-115 (1984); see also Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298,418 A.2d 217 (1980) (character witness can give personal opinion if there is an adequate basis for that opinion).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
V.S. 1111 (1977); Sims v. Callahan, 269 Ala. 216,112 So. 2d 776 (1959); Griggs v.
State, 494 P.2d 795 (Alaska 1972); People v. Birdette, 22 III. 2d 577, 177 N.E.2d 170
(1961). See generally G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 81, at 285-92 (1978); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 43; 3A J. WIGMORE, supra
note 10, § 980, at 985-87. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow impeachment for all
crimes involving dishonesty and for other major crimes when the probative value of
the conviction outweighs its prejudicial impact. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). For a discussion of Federal Rule 609(a), as well as a suggested approach for applying the rule
when the witness is the criminal defendant, see Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach to Applying the
"Balancing" Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 907 (1980). As to the
admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes in Maryland, see Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 708,436 A.2d 906,910 (1981) (allowing the introduction
of felonies, infamous crimes, crimes involving moral turpitude, deceit, or dishonesty, and lesser crimes that reflect upon truthtelling). Difficulty exists, however, in
determining whether a prior conviction is relevant to credibility. One Maryland
court noted that "no rigid classification of crimes seems possible." Linkin v. State,
202 Md. 212, 220, 96 A.2d 246,250 (1953). Another court, noting what it called a
lacuna in Maryland case law, reasoned that this ambiguity regarding prior convictions "has done much to unsettle and to confuse the law." Taylor v. State, 278 Md.
150, 155,360 A.2d 430,434 (1976) (quoting 3A J. WIG,.MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 987 (Chadborn rev. 1970».
13. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 980, at 828; see Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701,
436 A.2d 906 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666, 174 A.2d 122 (1961); Lehr v. Rogers,
16 Mich. App. 585, 168 N.W.2d 636 (1969); State v. Cleveland, 583 S.W.2d 263
(Mo. App. 1979); Schreiberg v. Southern Coatings & Chem. Co., 231 S.C. 69, 97
S.E.2d 214 (1957); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42.
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Evidence, IS allow inquiry into acts that are probative of a witness's veracity. Other courts permit cross-examination regarding any specific act
that demonstrates a lack of moral character. 16 Under this liberal approach, the act may be only slightly related to credibility,17 A minority of
courts, however, prohibits any inquiry into acts of misconduct for which
there has been no criminal conviction. IS Although few jurisdictions have
adopted this blanket prohibition, one commentator argues that this rule
is the fairest because it lessens the dangers of prejudice to the witness,
confusion of the issues, and abuse in the asking of unfounded questions. 19
In addition, this commentator asserts that this approach is practical in
that it is often difficult to determine whether particular acts are probative
of a witness's veracity.20
The confusion among the various jurisdictions regarding the admissibility of prior bad acts is reflected in the disparate decisions that often
exist within one jurisdiction. 21 Maryland courts recognize that decisional law regarding the use of prior bad acts to impeach is inconsistent. 22 The Maryland rule regarding the admissibility of accusations of
crime or misconduct, however, is explicit: mere accusations are strictly
forbidden. 23 In addition, Maryland courts have consistently held that extrinsic evidence of particular acts may not be used to impeach the char15. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Federal Rule 608(b) provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking
or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in
rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in
the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character
the witness being cross-examined has testified.
See United States v. Estell, 539 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982
(1976).
16. See People V. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198,93 N.E.2d 637 (1950); State V. Jones, 215 Tenn.
20, 385 S.W.2d 80 (1964); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42.
17. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42.
18. See Coleman V. Southern Pac., 141 Cal. 2d 121, 296 P.2d 386 (1956); Berliner V.
Schoenberg, 117 Pa. Super. 254, 178 A. 330 (1935); Christie V. Brewer, 374 S. W.2d
908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 42.
19. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 83; see also COX V. State, 51 Md. App. 271,
286,443 A.2d 607, 617 (1982) (Lowe, J., dissenting), affd, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d
319 (1983) (quoting C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 83).
20. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 83.
21. Compare Neam V. State, 14 Md. App. 180, 286 A.2d 540 (1972) (prior bad acts
falling short of arrest completely inadmissible) with Mulligan V. State, 18 Md. App.
588, 308 A.2d 418 (1973) (prior bad acts admissible if probative of veracity). See
also COX V. State, 51 Md. App. 271, 286, 443 A.2d 607,617 (1982) (Lowe, J., dissenting) (confusion exists in Maryland as to the rule concerning prior bad acts),
affd, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (1983). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note
7, at 82.
22. See COX V. State, 51 Md. App. 271, 286,443 A.2d 607, 617 (1982) (Lowe, J., dissenting), affd, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (1983); Johnson V. State, 30 Md. App.
512, 514, 352 A.2d 371, 372 (1976).
23. See Martens Chevrolet V. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 339-40,439 A.2d 534, 540-41 (1982);
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acter or reputation of a witness. 24 Extrinsic evidence, or independent
proof, is evidence obtained from a source such as documents or witnesses
other than the witness sought to be impeached. 25 Confusion resulted,
however, when the courts failed clearly to determine whether a witness
could be questioned directly as to his own prior bad acts. 26
As early as 1919, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Rau v.
State,21 recognized as well settled the rule that a witness could be impeached only by attacking his reputation for truth and veracity, and not
by inquiry into particular acts of misconduct, even though the particular
act may have been probative of veracity.28 This broad statement of the
rule, however, has led to confusion because the Rau court appeared to be
prohibiting only extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior bad acts, and not
direct inquiry into the witness's own such acts.29 Thus, the Rau court
left unanswered whether a witness could be questioned about his own
prior bad acts for impeachment purposes. In the 1937 case of Mahan v.
State,30 the court of appeals had an opportunity to clarify the ambiguity
created by Rau, but failed to do so. In Mahan, a wrongful death action
against a taxicab driver, the driver was asked on direct examination to
state his age. On cross-examination he was asked whether he had falsely
stated his age in a chauffeur's license application. 3l Instead of delineating a rule as to whether inquiry into a witness's own prior bad acts was
allowed, the court, reasoning that the driver's misstatement of his age
adversely reflected on his credibility, summarily concluded that it was
"obvious enough" that such a line of inquiry was permissible. 32 Thus,

24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.

Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 170, 155 A. 153, 156 (1931). See generally Annot.,
28 A.L.R.4TH 505 (1984).
See, e.g., Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982); Richardson v. State, 103 Md. 112,63 A. 317 (1906); Potfv. State, 3 Md. App. 289,239 A.2d
121 (1968).
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 67.
See Johnson v. State, 30 Md. App. 512, 514,352 A.2d 371, 372 (1976); Rau v.
State, 133 Md. 613, 616-17, 105 A. 867, 868 (1919).
133 Md. 613, 105 A. 867 (1919).
Id. at 616-18, 105 A. at 867.
Id. The confusion caused by the decision is indicated by the belief of the court of
special appeals in Cox that Rau was not good precedent. Cox v. State, 51 Md. App.
271,275,443 A.2d 607, 610 (1982), affd, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (1983).
172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575 (1937).
Id. at 379-80, 191 A. at 578-79.
Id. at 380, 191 A. at 579. The case of Sappington v. Fairfax, 135 Md. 186, 108 A.
575 (1919), a suit for malicious prosecution, also failed to clarify the rule regarding
the admissibility of prior bad acts. The trial court in Sappington had permitted a
defense witness to be cross-examined as to whether he knew at the time he testified
against the plaintiff before a grand jury that the plaintiff had not stolen the property
in question. The court of appeals in Sappington simply held that the evidence was, if
for no other purpose, at least admissible for the purpose of attacking the witness's
credibility. Id. at 192, 108 A. at 578. After these early cases, one commentator
termed the law in Maryland regarding prior bad acts as "obfuscated." Kauffman,
Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Maryland, 7 MD. L. REv. 118, 126
(1943).
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Mahan seemed to limit Rau to prohibiting extrinsic evidence of prior bad
acts, but allowing the witness himself to be asked about them.
Subsequent case law failed to elucidate a Maryland rule concerning
inquiry into a witness's own prior bad acts. In Neam v. State,33 the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the state could not crossexamine the defendant as to his prior narcotics addiction for purposes of
impeachment. 34 The court first analogized the use of prior bad acts to
the use of prior convictions, noting that the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes had been limited by statute. 3S Because
of the danger of insufficient proof of prior bad acts not resulting in conviction, the court therefore determined, in contrast to Mahan, that it was
logical to exclude completely evidence of prior misconduct falling short
of arrest. 36 The Neam court further reasoned that although narcotics addiction was highly relevant to the witness's credibility, evidence of the
addiction was inadmissible because of the undue prejudice to the witness
that would result from its use. 37
Another Maryland case, however, deviated from Neam's total prohibition of evidence of prior misconduct falling short of arrest. In DeLilly v. State, 38 the court of special appeals held that the trial court erred
in refusing to permit the defendant in a rape case to impeach the victim's
identification testimony by showing that she had previously misidentified
another person accused of rape. 39 The basis for the DeLiIly court's holding was that the specific act was directly relevant to the witness's credibility.40 Thus, the conflicting decisions in DeLiIly and Neam, as well as
the ambiguity created by Rau, left the law unsettled regarding the use of
33. 14 Md. App. 180, 286 A.2d 540 (1972).
34. Id. at 187-90, 286 A.2d at 545-46.
35. Id. at 188, 286 A.2d at 545. The Neam court was referring to what is now MD. CTs.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1O-905(a) (1984), which provides in pertinent part:
"[e]vidence of conviction is not admissible if an appeal is pending, or the time for an
appeal has not expired, or the conviction has been reversed, and there has been no
retrial or reconviction."
36. Neam, 14 Md. App. at 187-90, 286 A.2d at 545-46.
37. Id. The court balanced the undue prejudice against the utility of determining testimonial veracity. Another decision that stood for the proposition that Maryland
courts would be firm in refusing to allow inquiry into prior bad acts to impeach was
Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982). In Martens, the
court of appeals decided whether defense counsel, in a negligent misrepresentation
case, could cross-examine a witness as to whether the witness had been charged with
fraud in a previous lawsuit. Id. at 338-39, 439 A.2d at 540-41. In holding that the
introduction of the question consituted reversible error, the court stated that Maryland courts have firmly adhered to the rule forbidding evidence of specific acts for
impeachment purposes, particularly when the evidence amounts to a mere accusation. Id. at 340, 439 A.2d at 541.
38. 11 Md. App. 676,276 A.2d 417 (1971).
39. Id. at 680-81, 276 A.2d at 419.
40. Id. A similar case to DeLi/ly is Mulligan v. State, 18 Md. App. 588,308 A.2d 418
(1973). In Mulligan, the court of special appeals held that it was reversible error to
disallow cross-examination of the state's main witness, a police officer, concerning
the officer's having been found guilty in a police disciplinary proceeding for falsifying police reports. Id. at 597, 308 A.2d at 423. The court held that although it was
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prior bad acts for impeachment purposes. Extrinsic evidence of prior
bad acts was clearly prohibited, but the propriety of inquiry directed at
the witness himself was undecided.
The case of State v. Cox 41 presented the issue whether the testimony
of a prosecuting witness in a rape case could be impeached on crossexamination by inquiry into specific acts of prior misconduct. 42 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that inquiry into prior bad acts was
permissible provided there was a reasonable basis for the question and
the misconduct was probative of the witness's credibility.43 In reaching
this conclusion, the court first referred to the general rule that a witness
may be cross-examined as to any matter that would be likely to affect his
credibility.44 In analogizing to the rule that extrinsic evidence of prior
convictions is permitted to impeach provided the conviction is relevant to
credibility,4S the Cox court concluded that a witness could also be asked
about prior bad acts not resulting in conviction, so long as they were
relevant to credibility.46 Such inquiry could only be conducted, however,
when there was a reasonable basis for the question, there was little likelihood that confusion of the issue would result, and the purpose of the
inquiry was not to embarrass or harass the witness. 47
The admissibility of prior bad acts was distinguished from the admissibility of a mere accusation of misconduct on the ground that evidence of prior bad acts established a fact rather than an accusation; here
the evidence established that the witness had lied under oath in a similar
situation. 48 The court buttressed its reasoning by distinguishing Martens
Chevrolet v. Seney,49 a fraud case relied on by the prosecution. In Martens, the court of appeals held that questioning a witness regarding
whether he had previously been charged with fraud constituted reversible
error. so In distinguishing Martens, the Cox court emphasized that for

41.
42.

43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.

not authorizing a "baseless fishing expedition" into the witness's alleged misconduct, such inquiry was crucial because it indicated the officer's lack of veracity. Id.
State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (19.83).
Id. at 180-81,468 A.2d at 322. Maryland's rape shield law prohibits the introduction of evidence relating to a prosecutrix's reputation for unchastity in rape cases.
Specific acts of sexual conduct are generally inadmissible, although previous consensual encounters with the accused are admissible as evidence of the probability of
consent. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1957). See generally Note, Rape And
Other Sexual Offense Law Reform in Maryland, 1976-1977, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 151
(1977). Cox dealt with none of these issues. State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d
319 (1983).
298 Md. at 184, 468 A.2d at 324.
Id. at 178,468 A.2d at 321 (citing Harris v. State, 237 Md. 299, 302, 206 A.2d 254,
256 (1965); Kantor v. Ash, 215 Md. 285, 290, 137 A.2d 661, 664 (1958».
See supra text accompanying note 12.
Cox, 298 Md. at 178-79,468 A.2d at 321-22.
Id. at 179,468 A.2d at 322.
Id. at 183, 468 A.2d at 323.
292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982).
/d. at 340, 439 A.2d at 541. The witness in Martens was not a party to the action.
Courts generally will apply stricter scrutiny when the witness is a party, especially
when the witness is the defendant. See United States v. Schiller, 187 F.2d 572, 576
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impeachment purposes, the proper inquiry was whether the witness actually committed the act, not whether he had been merely accused of committing it,51 Accusations of guilt are hearsay and therefore have little
bearing on a witness's credibility. Hence, the court concluded that the
inquiry in Martens did not purport to elicit information probative of the
witness's truth telling. 52 In Cox, the prosecutrix had lied under oath.
This act related directly to her character for veracity and therefore aided
the jury's assessment of her credibility. In addition, the court noted that
the witness was not disadvantaged by unfair surprise because the examiner was bound by her answer; if the prosecutrix denied the prior misconduct, extrinsic evidence could not be introduced to contradict her. 53
The court also distinguished the rule set forth in Rau v. State 54 forbidding the introduction of extrinsic evidence as to prior bad acts. In
Rau, a statutory rape case, the prosecutrix's father was asked on crossexamination whether his daughter had once told him that she had had
sexual relations with a neighbor, and then later recanted her accusation.
Although the specific act was probative of the witness's credibility, the
Cox court noted that the inquiry was made to one who had not committed the act, and therefore constituted inadmissible extrinsic evidence. 55
Thus, the Cox decision interpreted Rau as establishing a general rule that
although extrinsic evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible for impeachment purposes, the witness may be questioned on cross-examination
about prior bad acts that are probative of his own credibility.56
The Cox court then determined that although the scope of crossexamination is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the trial judge,
the judge may not limit examination so that the accused is clearly prevented from obtaining a fair trial. 57 Thus, inquiry into a prior false accusation of assault made by the prosecutrix was relevant to determining her
credibility, particularly when the prosecution's case depended upon her
identification of the defendant. The court held that the trial judge's prohibition of the defense counsel's inquiry was reversible error. 58
Under our adversarial system of justice, a trial is characterized as a
search for the truth. 59 In order to obtain this result, the fact finder must
often choose between conflicting testimony. It is therefore essential that
the witness's veracity, and hence his credibility, be subject to cross-exam(2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, C.]., concurring); Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701,436 A.2d
906 (1981); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976). See generally Note,
Limiting The Use of Prior Bad Acts and Convictions to Impeach the Defendant- Witness, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1099 (1981).
51. 298 Md. at 181,468 A.2d at 322-23.
52.Id.
53. Id. at 179,468 A.2d at 321-22.
54. 133 Md. 613, 105 A. 867 (1919).
55. Cox, 298 Md. at 182-83, 468 A.2d at 323.
56.Id.
57. Id. at 183-84, 468 A.2d at 324.
58. Id. at 184-85, 468 A.2d at 324-25.
59. Id. at 178, 468 A.2d at 321.

396

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 14

ination. Although the risk of undue prejudice to the witness exists, impeachment by the introduction of prior bad acts is necessary to further
the goal of determining the truth.
Cox clarified the Maryland rule concerning use of prior bad acts for
impeachment purposes, and aligned Maryland with the majority of jurisdictions. 6O The Cox court recognized the balance that must be struck
between the right to cross-examine a witness and assess his credibility,
and the possible unfair prejudice that could result from admitting specific instances of misconduct. The jurisdictions prohibiting any crossexamination into prior misconduct61 demonstrate more concern with
preventing abuses resulting from the admission of prior bad acts than
with properly assessing a witness's credibility. In wisely rejecting this
blanket prohibition, Cox emphasizes that allowing relevant cross-examination to rebut any assumption of the witness's veracity is necessary to
further the search for the truth.
Although Cox provides some guidelines as to what types of prior
bad acts are admissible, its holding is limited by the narrow issue considered by the court. The Cox court restricted the issue to whether a prosecutrix in a rape case could be impeached by prior bad acts. The court
therefore left open whether a character witness or defendant could also
be impeached by prior bad acts.62 A case decided by the court of appeals
the day after Cox, however, interpreted Cox as applying to all witnesses. 63 Robinson v. State 64 provided a clear test for determining when
prior bad acts are admissible for impeachment purposes. 65 Relying on
Cox, the court established a two-pronged test that permits a witness to be
questioned only about prior bad acts that: (1) were closely related to the
witness's veracity; and (2) contained a reasonable basis for believing that
the conduct has actually occurred. 66 This two-pronged test provides a
useful guide to Maryland attorneys by preventing the confusion that
would have resulted from the narrow holding in Cox.
Because of the obvious dangers of insufficient proof, the probative
value of admitting prior bad acts should be subject to greater scrutiny
than the probative value of prior convictions. The Robinson court, following this reasoning, indicated that in certain instances inquiry about
60. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. There is, however, at least one exception
recognized in California: prior false claims brought by juvenile girls in sex offense
cases. See People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal. App. 2d 334, 333 P.2d 82 (1958). For a
discussion of the admissibility of accusations against others similar to charges now
brought in sex offense cases, see Annot., 75 A.L.R.2n 500 (1961).
62. Cox, 298 Md. at 180-81, 468 A.2d at 322.
63. Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 193,468 A.2d 328 (1983).
64. [d.
65. The court in Robinson rejected the argument that a character witness's alleged assault, arson, and unauthorized departure from a mental institution were proper
grounds of inquiry on cross-examination. [d. at 198-200,468 A.2d at 331.
66. [d. at 201, 468 A.2d at 333. The Robinson court held that the previous acts of
misconduct failed the first prong of the test. [d. at 198-200, 468 A.2d at 331-32.

1985]

State v. Cox

397

prior bad acts not resulting in convictions should not be allowed even
though the same inquiry should be allowed if conviction had resulted. 67
Thus, under Cox and Robinson, particular acts of dishonesty such as falsifying reports,68 lying on applications,69 and bringing false claims70 will
be admissible because they are probative of a witness's veracity. In comparison, accusations of misconduct,71 drug addictions,72 and indecent
and unchaste acts 73 will be inadmissible because they do not aid the
factfinder in determining whether the witness is telling the truth. Robinson also indicated that assaults not resulting in convictions will be inadmissible because acts committed in the heat of passion have little bearing
on a witness's tendency to tell the truth. 74
Maryland courts have admitted prior bad acts for impeachment purposes only when the prior acts were documented. Previous documentation therefore seems to be required by the "reasonable basis" prong of the
Robinson test. Thus, trial transcripts,75 state records,76 and administrative reports77 have been deemed to establish a sufficient basis for inquiry
into prior bad acts.
Whether undocumented evidence of prior bad acts may be used to
impeach is left unanswered by both Cox and Robinson. The reasonable
basis prong of the Robinson test should be limited to only those acts that
are documented, however, in order to prevent unfounded questions from
being asked. This interpretation also facilitates formation of more specific questions, which diminishes the impact of a witness's denial of the
prior bad act. As noted in Cox, a witness's denial of a prior bad act
requires counsel to accept the answer and thus precludes him from further efforts to impeach through that particular bad act.78 The more detailed the cross-examiner's question, however, the greater the possibility
that the jury will believe the witness committed the act, because the specific nature of the inquiry suggests that a reasonable basis exists for believing the conduct actually took place. 79 Moreover, if the jury believes
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

73.
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 193, 200, 468 A.2d 328, 332 (1983).
See Mulligan v. State, 18 Md. App. 588, 308 A.2d 418 (1973).
See Mahan v. State, 172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575 (1937).
See State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (1983).
See Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328,439 A.2d 534 (1982).
See Neam v. State, 14 Md. App. 180, 286 A.2d 540 (1972).
See Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981); Richardson v. State, 103
Md. 112,63 A. 317 (1906).
Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 193, 198-99, 468 A.2d 328, 331 (1983); cf Thomas v.
State, 29 Md. App. 45, 349 A.2d 384 (1975) (prior assault conviction inadmissable
on issue of credibility), cert. denied, 278 Md. 736 (1976).
See State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173,468 A.2d 319 (1983).
See Mahan v. State, 172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575 (1937).
See Mulligan v. State, 18 Md. App. 588, 308 A.2d 418 (1973).
State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 179,468 A.2d 319, 321-22 (1983).
See 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 981, at 838. For example, consider the following cross-examination: "Q: Witness, is it true that on October 1, 1981, at approximately 5:00 p.m., you were arrested by an Officer Homes for allegedly stealing
a Jensen car stereo model number 4477 from a 1970 Blue Volkswagon Beetle Mary-
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the prior bad act occurred, and then the witness denies the act under
oath, they will be even more likely to distrust the witness's testimony
concerning the case. In comparison, asking a highly detailed question for
which no reasonable basis exists causes undue prejudice to the witness,
and, as Cox indicated, is prohibited.
In accordance with the rule forbidding use of extrinsic evidence for
impeachment, the introduction of documents proving prior bad acts
should be prohibited. One Maryland court has permitted the introduction of documents that formed the reasonable basis for the inquiry in
order to contradict the witness's denial of the act.80 This practice is unacceptable under Cox, because the theory behind the rule requiring counsel to accept the witness's answer is that unfair surprise is avoided
because the witness does not have to produce rebuttal evidence. 8! In order to prevent unfair surprise, encourage judicial economy, and avoid
confusion of the issues, the introduction of such documents should be
forbidden.
An inconsistency results from Cox's adoption of the majority rule
that inquiry into prior bad acts for impeachment is permitted when the
inquiry is probative of veracity, but prohibited when it involves mere accusations or charges of misconduct. A conflict arises between the two
principles when the witness has been charged with, but not convicted of,
some alleged misconduct, and the inquiry satisfies the Robinson twoprong test. 82 When such an overlap of the rules occurs, inquiry concerning the prior bad act should be permitted. Under the present Maryland
rule, inquiry into charges or accusations of misconduct is forbidden because proof that the act was actually committed is lacking. Yet as long as
the reasonable basis prong of the two-prong test is satisfied, the danger of
lack of proof is eliminated.
The Cox decision makes it clear that prior bad acts may be used to
impeach a witness's credibility so long as the act is probative of veracity
and is readily provable. Cox provides greater latitude to the cross-examiner to inquire into prior misconduct, and sets forth adequate standards
to determine when inquiry should be permitted. 83 While the need to as-

80.
81.
82.

83.

land License E.C. from the parking lot at 800 Charles St. in Baltimore, Md.? A:
No." In such a situation, the jury may tend to believe that the theft actually
occurred.
Mahan v. State, 172 Md. 373, 379, 191 A. 575, 578-79 (1937) (certified copy of
license application admitted to show defendant lied on the application). But see
supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
Cox, 298 Md. at 199, 468 A.2d at 322.
For example, the inquiry in Cox would be admissible under the two-prong test because there was a reasonable basis for asking the prosecutrix about bringing a false
claim, and the act was probative of the prosecutrix's veracity. If, before the Cox
case, the state had brought a perjury charge against the prosecutrix for lying under
oath, and that charge was pending when Cox was tried, then the inquiry would
apparently not be admissible because of the rule prohibiting inquiry into mere accusations or charges of misconduct.
One indication that Cox represents a significant change in Maryland law is that the
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sess accurately a witness's credibility is great, that need must be weighed
against the prejudice to the witness and confusion to the fact finder
caused when specific acts are admitted to impeach. The problem of determining whether certain specific acts are probative of truthtelling is reflected in the difficulty Maryland courts have encountered in determining
which prior convictions are probative of veracity.84 Maryland's rule,
which allows impeachment by prior convictions ranging from the vague
"crimes of moral turpitude"85 to lesser crimes that go to truth telling, 86 is
too ambiguous a standard to determine properly which prior convictions
are admissible to assess a witness's credibility. In comparison, the twopronged test as to specific acts not resulting in conviction, as established
in Cox and Robinson, provides Maryland courts with a much needed
standard of strict scrutiny for determining what prior bad acts can be
used to impeach.

John Jude Hathway

Maryland Judges' Benchbook, a quick reference for trial judges compiled prior to
the Cox decision, stated: "[c]redibility of a witness may not be attacked or supported
by evidence of specific instances of conduct of a witness . . . . Maryland has not
followed those jurisdictions which permit a witness to be cross-examined as to specific conduct not reSUlting in criminal conviction." MARYLAND TRIAL JUDGES'
BENCH BOOK, EV-18 (1977).
84. See supra note 12.
85. See Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 706-07, 436 A.2d 906, 909 (1981).
86. Id. at 708, 436 A.2d at 910.

